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Sticks and stones may break one's bones but outrageous words
and other extreme and outrageous conduct, which is intended to
cause and does cause severe emotional distress is a recoverable tort
in North Carolina under the law of "intentional infliction of emotional distress."1 While the development within North Carolina of
this intentional tort traces back to 1936,2 and arguably further
back in time to 1906, 3 the formal supreme court recognition did
not come about until 1979.' Even then, further clarification of the
requisite evidentiary showing was required by the court in 1981.
Therefore, this may be deemed the tenth anniversary year of the
tort "intentional infliction of emotional distress" in North Carolina. In honor of this milestone, this Survey is an overview of relative North Carolina caselaw since 1981 concerning the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Comment will focus on what
pleadings are deemed sufficient to survive Rule 12b(6) defenses, as
well as what material facts will deny both summary judgment motions and judgments notwithstanding the verdicts. Conversely, this
Survey will show where the courts have found certain pleadings
and evidentiary showings to be lacking, as a matter of law, as they
1. Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).
2. Id. at 449, 276 S.E.2d at 333 (citing Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210
N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936)).
3. Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906), overruled on other

grounds, Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assoc., 327 N.C. 283, 395
S.E.2d 85, reh'g denied, 327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133 (1990).
4. Dickens, at 452, 276 S.E.2d at 335 (citing Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C.
181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979)).
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relate to the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This Survey will first proceed with a developmental caselaw
history of what eventually became recognized as the "intentional
infliction of emotional distress." It will explore the analytical underpinnings of the modern tort and the two major elementary variances in relation to its caselaw ancestry; physical injury and
foreseeability.
Next, North Carolina caselaw regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress since 1981, from both the North Carolina
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, will be examined. Salient
trial level procedural history relating to Rule 12b(6) defenses, summary judgment, directed verdict and j.n.o.v. motions will be discussed, and how the trial and appellate level applied caselaw to the
facts in order to decide whether the plaintifs tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress would pass its respective procedural barrier.
Finally, this Survey will attempt to discern if a factual judicial
mindset exists, static or otherwise, as to when a defendant's " 'conduct exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society' and
the conduct 'causes mental distress of a very serious kind.' -5In
essence, what pleading or evidentiary showing will cause the judiciary in North Carolina to find "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,
(2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe emotional
distress to another."6
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TORT

In the 1906 case of Kimberly v. Howland,7 the Supreme Court
5. Id. at 447, 276 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting Stanback 297 N.C. at 196, 254
S.E.2d 'at 622).
6. Id. at 452, 276 S.E.2d at 335.
7. 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906). Plaintiff showed that defendant blasted
rock, using dynamite, on the outskirts of the city of Asheville' and within approximately 175 yards from plaintiff's residence. Id. at 401, 55 S.E. at 779. Justice
Mitchell in Ruark, a case dealing with the negligent infliction of emotional distress, stated that "[tihe Kimberly opinion was the first opinion of this Court to
characterize, unfortunately, emotional injury as a type of physical injury-albeit
injury for which plaintiffs could recover in emotional distress." Ruark 327 N.C. at
294, 395 S.E.2d at 91. Justice Mitchell further stated that:
[c]laims for negligent infliction of emotional distress have been recognized by this Court for at least one hundred years . .. [t]he history of the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in North Carolina begins
for all practical purposes with Young v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.C. 370, 11
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2
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of North Carolina decided a case involving the plaintiff's wife being frightened into a near miscarriage, while wrecking her nervous
system, all by a rock which had been negligently thrown through
her house by the defendant's blasting operation.8 The defendant
contended that "(1) That the evidence discloses no negligent act.
(2) That the defendant's agents could not have reasonably foreseen
the consequences of their acts. (3) That the injury complained of
by the wife was the result of fright only, for which no recovery can
be had." 9
The court found the "evidence of negligence amply sufficient
to have been submitted to the jury,''' and that "a man of ordinary
prudence should have foreseen the probable consequences of blasting with dynamite in such a neighborhood without properly
smothering the blast."" Regarding the defendant's third contention, that the wife could not recover for her alleged injury, the
court noted that "most respectable authority" supported the defendant's assertion that wife's injuries resulting from fright could
not be recovered for if they were without contemporaneous physical injury.1 2 However, the court noted that "where the fright occasions physical injury, not contemporaneous with it, but directly
traceable to it, the courts are hopelessly divided.

13

The court also

noted that the rock "greatly shocked her nervous system and
nearly caused a miscarriage. .

"..4

The court held that "the injury to the wife was a physical inS.E. 1044 (1890) ..

Ruark, 327 N.C. at 291, 395 S.E.2d at 89. See also Hancock v. Telegraph Co., 137
N.C. 497, 49 S.E. 952 (1905) (for the proposition that physical injury is not necessitated for the recovery of the negligent infliction of emotional distress); Bowers v.
Telegraph Co., 135 N.C. 504, 47 S.E. 597 (1904).
8. Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 401, 55 S.E. 778, 779 (1906).
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing Blackwell v. Railroad, 111 N.C. 151, 16 S.E. 12 (1891)). The
Court stated that "[It was in evidence that the blasts were fired off without being
properly 'smothered', and that 'smothering' is a safe method usually employed in
such operations, and that, had it been properly done on this occasion, the injury
to plaintiffs' residence could not well have resulted." Id.
11. Id. The court further stated that "[plersons using such an inflammable
and powerful instrumentality as dynamite are charged with knowledge of its
probable consequences which they could by reasonable diligence have acquired.
Id. at 401, 55 S.E. at 779-80.
12. Id. at 403, 55 S.E. at 780.
13. Id.
14. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
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jury resulting from shock and fright."'" Most importantly, the
court stated that the physical injury was "nervous physical pain"'
in that:
[t]he nerves are as much a part of the physical system as the
limbs, and in some person are very delicately adjusted, and, when
'out of tune,' cause excruciating agony. We think the general principles of the law of torts support a right of action for physical
injuries resulting from negligence, whether willful or otherwise,
none the less strongly because the physical injury 7consists of a
wrecked nervous system instead of lacerated limbs.
Finally, the court approvingly quoted the trial judge as clearly
stating the law, as follows:
While fright and nervousness alone do not constitute an injury
within the meaning of this issue, if this fright and nervousness is
the natural and direct result of the negligent act of the defendant,
and if this fright and nervousness naturally and directly causes an
impairment of health or loss of bodily power, then this would
constitute an injury within the meaning of this Issue.' 8
In Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corporation,9 a 1936 supreme
court case, Chief Justice Stacy decided the issue of whether the
plaintiff's complaint stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant corporation,
through its collecting agent, called plaintiff a deadbeat and
threatened to have her arrested for failing to pay a debt owed to
the defendant, and that these actions resulted in the premature
birth of her dead child.20 While there was evidence refuting the
premature status of the child,2 ' the jury found the defendant liable
and awarded $1,000 in damages.2 2
The court held that defendant's demurrer must be overruled
and that the "gravamen," or injury specially complained of, lay in
trespass to the person, and that this may be either willfully or negligently inflicted.2 The court stated that "[i]t is no doubt correct
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 403-04, 55 S.E. at 780.
Id. at 404, 55 S.E. at 780-81.
210 N.C. 808, 810, 188 S.E. 625, 626 (1936).
Id. at 809, 188 S.E. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 809, 188 S.E. at 625-26.
Id. at 810, 188 S.E. at 626. See generally BLACK'S

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2
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to say that fright alone is not actionable2 ' ... but it is faulty paof serious proportions
thology to assume that nervous disorders
25
may not flow from fear or fright.
Perhaps with greatest insight, Chief Justice Stacy quoted with
approval Candler v. Smith, a 1935 Georgia appellate case, wherein
Justice Sutton stated:
As a general rule, damages for mere fright are not recoverable;
but they may be recovered where there is some physical injury
attending the cause of the fright, or, in the absence of physical
injury, where the fright is of such character as to produce some
physical or mental impairment directly and naturally resulting
from the wrongful act.26
In Sparks v. Tennesse Mineral Products Corp.,2 7 a 1937 case,
the supreme court once again decided the issue of whether fright
and nervousness alone, unaccompanied or followed by physical injury, should constitute an element of damages. Plaintiff alleged defendant was negligent in carrying out blasting operations near
plaintiff's house, and that his negligence resulted in a rock being
hurled through plaintiff's house causing her terrible shock and injury to her nerves, resulting in loss of weight, nervousness, periodical confinement in bed and other ailments.2 8 Citing with approval
Kimberly and Kirby, Justice Barnhill held that:
[w]hile fright and nervousness alone, unaccompanied or followed
by physical injury, do not constitute an element of damages, if
this fright and nervousness is a natural and direct result of the
negligent act of the defendant and naturally and directly causes
an impairment of health or loss of bodily power, then this would
constitute an element of injury to be considered by the jury.2 9
a on
1942
Chief of
Justice
StacyopinupSpencer,"
held In
theMartin
verdict v.and
judgment,
thecase,
authority
his earlier

(5th ed. 1979).
24. Id. at 812, 188 S.E. at 627 (citing Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 73 S.E.

211 (1911)).

25. Id. at 812, 188 S.E. at 627 (citing Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo. Ct. App. 4
(1901)).
26. Id. at 812-13, 188 S.E. at 627 (quoting Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667,
179 S.E. 395, 399 (1935)).
27. 212 N.C. 211, 213-14, 193 S.E. 31, 33 (1937).
28. Id. at 212, 193 S.E. at 32.
29. Id. at 213-14, 193 S.E. at 33.
30. 221 N.C. 28, 30, 18 S.E.2d 703, 703-04 (1942).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
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ion in Kirby. The plaintiff alleged that while she and her 16-year
old brother were replacing stakes which they thought had been
moved from their father's property line adjacent to that of,the defendant's property, the defendant called to her and her brother in
a loud and angry voice regarding his flowers. That defendant and
other members of his family approached the plaintiff and her
brother. The defendant threatened to kill the plaintiff's brother
and that the defendant looked like a maniac with his face red and
his forehead beading perspiration, that his voice was loud, vicious,
and angry. The defendant approached the plaintiff and her
brother, striking the brother. The defendant's behavior and appearance caused the plaintiff to faint. Plaintiff's husband picked
her up in a crying and jerky condition, and that as a result of defendant's actions, within in a month, plaintiff suffered a miscarriage in her fourth month of pregnancy.3 1 Testimony by physicians
asserted that the fright caused by the defendant could have produced the miscarriage of plaintiff's child.32 Stating that there was
evidence of "trespass to the person" of the defendant, Chief Justice Stacy affirmed the judgment, overruling a demurrer to the
complaint, and quoted COOLEY ON TORTS 3d with approval:
But if there may be a recovery for physical injuries resulting from
fright wrongfully caused by the defendant, it would seem that an
assault committed in the view of a woman whose presence is
known, especially upon a member of her family, was an act of
negligence towards the woman, a failure to exercise the due care
towards her which the occasion and circumstances required, and
was therefore a legal wrong against her which will support an action if damage follows.83
In 1960, the supreme court decided, in Williamson v. Bennett,3 4 whether the trial judge committed reversible error in overruling defendant's motion for nonsuit of plaintiff's personal injury
action. Justice Moore found that the plaintiff suffered no immediate physical injury from the collision with the defendant's motor
vehicle, that plaintiff did not see what had struck her motor vehi31. Id. at 29-30, 18 S.E.2d at 703.
32. Id. at 30, 18 S.E.2d at 703.
33. Id. at 30, 18 S.E.2d at 703-04 (quoting 1 COOLEY ON TORTS 98 (3rd ed.

1930)).
34. 251 N.C. 498, 502, 112 S.E.2d 48, 51 (1960), disapproved by, Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assoc., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85, reh'g denied, 327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133 (1990).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2
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cle until she drove one half block and then parked her vehicle beyond the point of collision, that she only heard "a grinding noise"
on her vehicle's left side, and perhaps most importantly,
she was
5
more than ordinarily predisposed to neurosis.1
Plaintiff gave evidence that the collision occurred near a
school building, in which children were in attendance at the time
of the collision, that her brother-in-law had killed a child one
month earlier in a collision and that the "grinding noise," in the
opinion of her psychiatrists, "triggered" a neurosis resulting in a
conversion reaction or pseudo-paralysis. 6 Justice Moore stated
that Kimberly was nearest in approach for precedental value and
quoted the trial court's charge to the jury "[t]his injury [fright and
nervousness] must be the natural and direct result of the negligent
act of the defendant and one which should have3 7been foreseen by
the defendant by the exercise of ordinary care.

1

Justice Moore denied recovery, agreeing with the defendant
that there was no causal connection between defendant's negligence and the fright, neurosis and conversion reaction experienced
by plaintiff, stating: "We agree that defendant's negligence was not
that cause which 'in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any new and independent cause,' produced the personal injury
plaintiff complains of."3 8 Justice Moore's analysis in denying recovery for personal injury, being predicated on the lack of causal connection between a breach of duty and the injury, was based on the
assertion that it was not the collision which caused plaintiff's neurosis, but a collision with a non-existent child. 39 Justice Moore
found support regarding this conclusion by these salient facts: 1) a
lack of testimony or contention that plaintiff was frightened by the
collision between her motor vehicle and defendant's: 2) a lack of
assertion that plaintiffs anxiety was occasioned by the "grinding
sound;" 3) plaintiff's only thoughts were that she had killed a child
on a bicycle; 4) plaintiff's more than ordinary predisposition to
neurosis; and 5) her brother-in-law's collision with a child had
deeply affected her and increased her proneness to emotional disturbance.40 In conclusion, Justice Story quoted with approval from
the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW on torts, "The actor's conduct is not
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

502-03, 112 S.E.2d
506, 112 S.E.2d at
507, 112 S.E.2d at
507, 112 S.E.2d at
507, 112 S.E.2d at

at 51.
54.
54.
55.
54-55.
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a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking
back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to
the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about
the harm."'"
Langford v. Shu,'2 a 1962 supreme court case, found Justice
Sharp ruling on an issue of nonsuit regarding a practical joke gone
awry. Plaintiff showed that defendant, who was a neighbor, after
having been warned of plaintiff's fear of snakes, approved and participated in a practical joke involving a box plaintiff believed to
contain a snake eating mongoose.'" In all actuality, the box only
contained a spring loaded furry object, which defendant's child released and subsequently caused plaintiff injury (a torn cartilage in
plaintiff's left knee) and fright." Citing Kirby, Justice Sharp
stated that defendant owed the plaintiff, "the duty not to subject
her to a fright which, in the exercise of due care or reasonable foresight, she should have known was likely to result in some injury to
her.' 4 5 Justice Sharp reversed the superior court's decision of
nonsuit."I
A practical joke proved actionable in yet another supreme
court case in 1965. In Slaughter v. Slaughter, the plaintiff, a 67year old mother, showed evidence that she suffered injuries (fracture of the left hip and fracture of the proximal end of the left
fibula requiring surgery) while in flight engendered by the defendant, her son, exploding firecrackers at night outside the window of
a room in which plaintiff occupied. 47 The plaintiff showed evidence
that upon hearing several reports, the plaintiff thought that she
and her grandchildren were fired upon, possibly by a shotgun. The
plaintiff further showed that both grandchildren were screaming,
"[slomebody is shooting at us; [s]omebody is shooting at us," that
plaintiff left her seat in a crouched position to escape the "firing,"
41. Id. at 508, 112 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS §
435(2) (Supp. 1948)).
42. 258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962).
43. Id. at 136-37, 128 S.E.2d at 211.
44. Id. at 137, 128 S.E.2d at 211.
45. Id. at 139, 128 S.E.2d at 212.
46. Id. at 141, 128 S.E.2d at 213.
47. 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965). Perhaps most egregious of all, plaintiff had been a guest at the defendant's home for two weeks and at the time of the
commission of the tort was babysitting the defendant's children, the plaintiff's
grandchildren. Id. at 733, 142 S.E.2d at 685.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2
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and that she subsequently fell and suffered injuries.4 s The single
contested issue of Slaughter was that of foreseeability.4 9 Defendant
contended, relying on general principles of foreseeability, that the
plaintiff's fall and resulting injuries, were not, as a matter of law,
reasonably foreseeable. 50 Justice Moore disagreed, and declared
that the trial judge committed no error in charging the jury with
respect to foreseeability in and its application, as an integral part,
in finding proximate cause. 5 '
In Crews v. Provident Finance Co., 2 a 1967 supreme court
case, a debt collector's abusive behavior towards a plaintiff in arrears once again created a jury question concerning whether recoverable damages were suffered and whether such damages were reasonably foreseeable, such that an award of nonsuit should be held
in error. The plaintiff offered evidence that she was an uneducated
elderly woman, that she borrowed $70.00 from the defendant, that
she gave the defendant a chattel mortgage on her furniture for
$244.90 and that she had paid up the arrearage to the defendant.
Subsequent to payment, a bill collector, acting as defendant's
agent, came to her home demanding still further payment in addition to threatening her in vulgar language with imprisonment. His
threats and demeanor caused her to get hot and have sharp pains
in her chest, she began to feel funny and nervous, and her heart
was about to burn up with sharp pains. She offered evidence that
she was "going around" and did not know anything until the next
morning and that the agent knew plaintiff had suffered previous
heart trouble. Upon visiting a physician the next morning, it was
discovered that "she was nervous and suffering with acute angina,
nervous, trembling in speech and emotionally disturbed." Her
blood pressure had gone from 170/180 to 220 and stayed at 220 for
two weeks. In answering a hypothetical question, the plaintiff's
physician testified that it was his opinion that the agent's visit and
threat could have caused the condition and that the condition will
cause the plaintiff irreparable damage. 53
48. Id. at 734, 142 S.E.2d at 685.
49. Id. at 735, 142 S.E.2d at 686. Justice Moore, in dicta, cited the general
rule that, although damages for mere fright are not recoverable, should there be
in addition to the fright contemporaneous physical injury resulting from defendant's conduct, there may be recovery. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 736-37, 142 S.E.2d at 686-87.
52. 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967).
53. Id. at 685-87, 157 S.E.2d at 384-85. Justice Pless at one point acerbically
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
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Justice Pless cited to Slaughter, stating that damages for mere
fright are generally not recoverable, but they may be if there is
contemporaneous physical injury."' In addition to this physical injury prong of fright, Justice Pless stated that the defendant might
have foreseen that some injury would result from his conduct or
that "consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been
expected." 56 He then cited to Kirby, as the leading case regarding
this fact scenario. Justice Pless dismissed defendant's claims that
Kirby was not applicable because it specifically dealt with fright
while the plaintiff's case at bar showed no evidence of fright, by
stating that plaintiff testified as being mad and that Kirby was not
limited to cases of fright.6 Justice Pless further stated:
Under Sec. 436 of the American Law Institutes Restatement of
the Law of Torts, under the heading, 'Physical harm resulting
from emotional disturbance,' it is stated: '(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to protect
another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the
actor should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm, the fact that the harm results solely through the internal

operation of the fright OR OTHER

EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

does not

protect the actor from liability. (2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to
another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, OR
OTHER SIMILAR AND IMMEDIATE EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE,

the fact

that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright
OR OTHER EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE does not protect the actor from
7

liability.' (Emphasis supplied).5

Justice Pless goes on to state that madness or anger, to the extent
of causing acute angina and high blood pressure, must certainly
qualify as an "emotional disturbance," and that "Webster defines
MAD as 'aroused or controlled by intense emotion' and 'furious because of abnormal excitation.' "58
In reversing the trial court, Justice Pless held that in finding
emotional disturbance from physical harm, the "physical injury"
commented that "[tihe defendant is not charged with usury, but the record is
remindful of the saying 'if you got it, you don't need it - if you need it, you don't
got it!'" Id. at 688, 157 S.E.2d at 385.
54. Id. at 689, 157 S.E.2d at 385.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 689, 157 S.E.2d at 386.
57. Id. at 689-90, 157 S.E.2d at 386.
58. Id. at 690, 157 S.E.2d at 386.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2
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requirement need not be visible, such as "a cut or a broken arm. 59
He found that it was beyond question that nervousness necessitating bedrest caused by an attack of acute angina and high blood
pressure gave rise to requisite "physical injury." 60
Therefore, from caselaw extending from Kimberly to Crews,
mental distress seemed to be an actionable tort, so long as the injury complained of was "foreseeable" and "physical" in nature.
Additionally, although caselaw had long termed the distress with
the moniker "fright," the actionable spectrum had been expanded
to "other emotional disturbance" which is foreseeable to cause
"bodily harm. '
II.

THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT

By 1979, the major trend in the United States was to recognize
the intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate intentional tort independent of physical injury or any requisite that the
alleged conduct constitute another recognizable tort.2 In 1979, the
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See generally Crews v. Provident Finance Co., 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d
381.
62. See Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); State Rubbish
Collectors Assoc. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970); Hiers v. Cohen, 31 Conn. Supp. 305,
329 A.2d 609 (1973); Strickland v. Hodges, 134 Ga. App. 909, 216 S.E.2d 706
(1975); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Amsden v. Grinnell
Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972); Dawson v. Associates Fin.
Serv. Co., 215 Kan. 814, 529 P.2d 104 (1974); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611, 86 A.L.R.3d
441 (1977); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976);
Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Mich. App. 688, 143 N.W.2d 612
(1966); Daniels v. Adkins Protective Services, Inc., 247 So. 2d 710 (Miss. 1971),
overruled on other grounds, First Nat. Bank v. Langley, 314 So.2d 324 (1975);
Warrem v. Parrish, 436 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1969); Paasch v. Brown, 193 Neb. 368,
227 N.W.2d 402 (1975), later appeal 199 Neb. 683, 260 N.W.2d 612 (1977), later
proceeding 217 Neb. 761, 351 N.W.2d 74 (1984); Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d
553, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 373 N.E.2d 1215 (1978); Hanke v. Global Van Lines, 533
F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976); Breeden v. League Servs. Corp., 575 P.2d 1374 (Okla.
1978); Pakos v. Clark, 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682 (1969); Forster v. Manchester,
410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963); Rhodes v. Security Fin. Corp., 268 S.C. 300, 233
S.E.2d 105 (1977); Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270
(1966); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), overruled on other
grounds, Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (1988); Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt. 472,
392 A.2d 431 (1978); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974);
Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis.
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North Carolina Supreme Court decided Stanback v. Stanback,63 a
case involving an alleged breach of a separation agreement and
dealing with the issue, among others, of whether the trial judge
properly dismissed plaintiff-wife's claim for punitive damages from
defendant-husband for breach of said contract. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant agreed that if plaintiff was unable to
deduct from her 1968 state and federal tax returns, the cost of her
attorney's fees, then defendant would pay plaintiff the resulting
increased state and federal tax burden. Both the I.R.S. and the
North Carolina Department of Revenue audited her 1968 tax return and disallowed $28,500.00 of a $31,000.00 deduction claimed
for attorney's fees. The defendant, upon demand, refused to pay
this tax deficiency, thus breaching said contract by not paying the
aforementioned increase in plaintiff's tax burden. In consequence
of not being solvent to pay this disallowance and subsequent to the
United States placing a lien on plaintiff's property, the plaintiff, in
1974, borrowed $18,099.51 by securing a deed of trust on her home
in order to pay off the deficiency owed to the I.R.S. As a result of
plaintiff being unable to pay off the loan, the lender was currently
in the process of foreclosing on plaintiff's home. The State of
North Carolina garnished plaintiff's funds owed to plaintiff by defendant for support and maintenance under the deed of separation
in the order of $2,989.00. Under an amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that consequential mental anguish damages were contemplated by the parties when they entered into agreement."
Plaintiff requested, among other relief, $100,000.00 in punitive
damages for the defendant's alleged breach of contract.15 The defendant moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion, regarding all of plaintiff's claims and requests for relief, except plaintiff's claim and request for general damages for breach of the
66
agreement.
2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
63. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
64. Id. at 183-84, 254 S.E.2d at 614-15.

65. Id. at 184, 254 S.E.2d at 615.
66. Id. In addition to requesting punitive damages and general damages for
breach of contract; plaintiff also requested $250,000.00 in consequential damages
as compensation for mental anguish and loss of reputation in the community.
Plaintiff also alleged and requested relief from defendant's "abuse of process"
caused by a separate suit initiated by the defendant; the trial court again granted
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss regarding this allegation. Id. The court of appeals
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2

12

Little:
and Progeny:
An Overview of Recent No
1992] <em>Dickens v. Puryear</em>
EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS

Justice Brock, writing for the supreme court, affirmed the
court of appeals decision which had affirmed the trial court's dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), except for the issue of punitive damages for the alleged breach of contract. 67 Writing that, although it
is generally ruled that there may be no recovery in punitive damages for breach of contract, with the exception of breach of contract to marry, when the breach of contract is accompanied by or
constitutes an identifiable tort, such tort may enable recovery for
punitive damages." Justice Brock then established for the first
time in North Carolina caselaw which is now known as the intentional infliction of emotional distress when he next wrote:
Because we think the allegations in plaintiffs complaint with respect to punitive damages are sufficient at least to state a claim
for damages for an identifiable tort accompanying a breach of
contract, the trial court's dismissal of that claim must be reversed. Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to state a claim for
what has become essentially

THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION

OF SERIOUS EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

Plaintiff has alleged that defend-

ant intentionally inflicted mental distress. This tort has been recognized in many states. William Prosser states that liability arises
under this tort when a defendant's 'conduct exceeds all bounds
usually tolerated by decent society' and the conduct 'causes
mental distress of a serious kind.' 6'
Justice Brock, after recognizing this tort, found support for it
in Kirby, specifically relating that plaintiff's physical suffering and
subsequent loss of a child born prematurely in Kirby was determinative in Chief Justice Stacy's ruling. Justice Brock stated that
"damages for fright are recoverable when some physical injury contemporaneously, naturally, and proximately results from the fright
1 70
caused by a defendant's negligent and wilful misconduct.
Justice Brock cited to other cases that applied Kirby, including Sparks, Martin, Langford, Slaughter, and Crews, noting that
affirmed the dismissals of the trial court, Id. and the supreme court affirmed the
court of appeals save the issue of punitive damages for defendant's alleged breach
of contract.
67. Id. at 199, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
68. Id. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 621 (citing Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291
N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976)).
69. Id. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 621-22 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 12, p.56 (4th ed. 1971)).
70. Id. at 197, 254 S.E.2d at 622 (citing Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp.,
210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936)).
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these cases allowed recovery in similar situations. 71 He cites Kirby
for the proposition that recovery is not limited to physical harm
resulting from fright only and that recovery may be based on fright
or other emotional disturbance resulting from the defendant's
72
conduct.
Finally, Justice Brock held that plaintiff in Stanback sufficiently stated a claim by alleging that she suffered "great mental
anguish and anxiety as a result of defendant's allegedly wilful, malicious, and calculated conduct. '73 Furthermore, Justice Brock
stated that although a physical injury resulting from the emotional
disturbance caused by the conduct of defendant is clearly required,
given broad caselaw regarding what actually constitutes physical
injury, e.g. Kimberly, he found her allegation, that she suffered
great mental anguish and anxiety, sufficient to proceed to trial on
the issue of whether "great mental anguish and anxiety has caused
''
physical injury. 74
Therefore, the court in Stanback formally recognized the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, seemingly aligning itself with not only the national trend but also the majority of jurisdictions. 7 5 However, in recognizing this tort, the court still retained
the element of a contemporaneous or resultant physical injury,
therefore denying this tort the independent status which other ju76
risdictions bestowed upon it.
7 7 the supreme court gave
In the 1981 case Dickens v. Puryear,
a definitive reading on the "tort alluded to" in Stanback, the intentional infliction of emotional distress. In writing the decision,
Justice Exum decided whether physical injury and foreseeability
were necessary elements of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 78 Plaintiff had specifically claimed intentional infliction of
emotional distress by the defendants. 79 Plaintiff had showed evidence that defendants lured plaintiff into the countryside, that one
defendant had pointed a pistol between plaintiff's eyes, that one
defendant directed four other men to leave their hiding spaces and
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 197, 254 S.E.2d at 622.
Id. at 198, 254 S.E.2d at 622.
Id. at 198, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
Id. at 198-99, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
Id. at 198, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).
Id. at 452, 276 S.E.2d at 335.
Id. at 438, 276 S.E.2d at 327.
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that they beat the plaintiff into semi-conscious. They handcuffed
the plaintiff and beat him further. One defendant threatened
plaintiff with castration while flashing a knife and cutting plaintiff's hair, and that one defendant and the others openly discussed,
in front of the plaintiff, whether to kill or castrate him. After two
hours, one defendant told the plaintiff "to go home, pull his telephone off the wall, pack his clothes, and leave the state of North
Carolina, otherwise he would be killed."8 The trial court entered
judgment for the defendants and the court of appeals affirmed, on
the basis that the one year statute of limitations concerning assault
and battery governed plaintiff's cause and that this statute had
been violated.8 1 Justice Exum held that the defendant's actions up
to, but not including, telling the defendant to go home and in essence "get out of town," constituted assault and battery and therefore were governed by the one year statute of limitations.8 2 However, with regards to defendant's threats of future action, they did
not threaten action in the imminent future, and therefore did not
constitute an "assault" as recognized by North Carolina common
law. 3 Justice Exum stated in a footnote that the doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another" would deny the one-year statute
of limitation found in G.S. 1-54(3), concerning "libel, slander, assault, battery, or false imprisonment," from applying to the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 8 He then declared that this
tort must therefore be governed by the general three year statute
of limitation found in G.S. 1-52(5), which applies to "any other
injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract
and not hereafter enumerated."8 5
Having found that the defendant's threat for the future was
not statutorily barred, Justice Exum then definitively stated the
80. Id. at 439. Evidently, the defendant's motive for such treatment of plaintiff concerned the 31 year old plaintiff sharing "sex, alcohol and marijuana" with
defendant's 17 year old daughter who had not yet graduated high school at the
time of the incident. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 444-45, 276 S.E.2d at 330-31. Thus, Justice Exum therefore affirmed that on the herein described actions for assault and battery, the trial court
was correct in applying a one year statute of limitations.
83. Id. at 444, 276 S.E.2d at 330 (citing Hayes v. Lancaster, 200 N.C. 293, 156
S.E. 530 (1931)).
84. Id. at 446, S.E.2d at 330.
85. Id.
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North Carolina rule for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and provided analysis of relevant caselaw history.8 Recognizing that the intentional infliction of emotional distress was "al-

luded to" in Stanback, Justice Exum quoted the

RESTATEMENT

as stating that "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. ' 87 The court then stated:
(SECOND) OF TORTS,

[The] holding in Stanback was in accord with the Restatement
definition ... We now reaffirm the holding... [t]here is, however,
troublesome DICTUM in Stanback that plaintiff, to recover for this
tort, 'must show some physical injury resulting from the emotional disturbance caused by defendant's alleged conduct' and
that the harm she suffered was a 'foreseeable result.'88
Justice Exum stated that not only was the dictum not necessary to
the holding but actually conflicted with the holding in certain respects, and that Stanback was now disapproved. 9 One conflict in
Stanback, which Justice Exum asserted in Dickens, is that if physical pain is an element within the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, why did the court hold that the plaintiff stated
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress when, as
noted, the plaintiff never alleged that she had suffered any physical injury.9 0 In regard to Stanback, requiring that the harm suffered from the defendant's actions be foreseeable, Justice Exum, in
Dickens, stated that the question of foreseeability should not arise
in that the actor acts intending to cause emotional distress, or is
recklessly indifferent to the likelihood that it may result.9 1 In an
attempted reconciliation with Stanback, Justice Exum wrote in
Dickens, "[w]e are now satisfied that the DICTUM in Stanback arose
from our effort to conform the opinion to LANGUAGE in some of our
earlier cases the HOLDINGS of which led ultimately to our recognition in Stanback of the tort intentional infliction of mental
86. Id. at 446-53, 276 S.E.2d at 332-35.
87.
88.
(1979)).
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 447, 276 S.E.2d at 332.
Id. (quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 198, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623
Id. at 448, 276 S.E.2d at 332.
Id.
Id. at 449, 276 S.E.2d at 333.
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distress." 92
The court then goes on to analyze Stanback's utilization of
caselaw found in Kirby, noting that Kirby "rightly or wrongly, has
been read to require some physical injury in addition to emotional
distress."" In addition, Justice Exum wrote of the other cases
which had relied on Kirby - Crews, Slaughter, Langford, Martin,
and Sparks, and that while these cases did permit recovery under
facts similar to those found in the modern tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, these cases were still broader in their
concept of liability.9 " Standing in contrast to the modern tort,
these cases were concerned with permitting recovery for both
mental and physical injuries, whether they be intentionally or negligently committed."
Finally, Justice Exum writes:
Stanback... should not be read as grafting "physical injury" and
"foreseeability" on the tort... Neither should it be read as grafting.. .-this tort on other theories of recovery for mental and emotional distress dealt with in our earlier cases . . . This tort ...
consists of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe emotional distress to
another. The tort may also exist where defendant's actions indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood that they will cause
severe emotional distress. Recovery may be had for the emotional
distress so caused and for any other harm which proximately results from the distress itself."
One of the first cases for appellate review concerning the rule
of law regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress reported after Dickens, is the 1982 North Carolina Court of Appeals
decision in Morrow v. Kings Dept. Stores, Inc.." In Morrow, the
plaintiff alleged that after he entered the defendant's store, he
purchased several items, including two shirts. After purchasing
these items, she attempted to leave said store, but upon approaching the exit, defendant's agent, a security guard, stopped the plaintiff. The agent removed one purchased shirt from a bag in plain92. Id.
93. Id. at 450, 276 S.E.2d at 334 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 12, p.59 n.19 (4th ed. 1971)).
94. Id. at 450-51, 276 S.E.2d at 334.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 452-53, 276 S.E.2d at 335.
97. 57 N.C. App. 13, 290 S.E.2d 732, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294
S.E.2d 210 (1982).
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tiff's possession containing the other purchased items, and, that as
a result of these acts, the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress and great embarrassment from the fact that defendant's actions occurred before numerous onlookers, including a friend of the
plaintiff's.9 8 In response to the defendant's motion for dismissal of
plaintiff's cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the trial court ruled that while the plaintiff's
complaint stated a complaint "for conversion of one shirt," the
complaint failed to state a claim "for severe emotional distress and
great embarrassment" or for punitive damages. 9 As a result of this
finding, the trial court dismissed all requests for relief, except the
conversion claim. 0 °
Judge Wichard, in affirming the trial court, decided whether
plaintiff could recover for emotional distress in an action for conversion."' He wrote that while:
[c]ases involving recovery for mental anguish in connection with
an action for conversion of personal property are collectible0 2 . . .
[and that] several jurisdictions allow such recovery, especially
when the conversion involves malice or insult 03 . . . [i]t appears
that absent malice, wantonness, or other aggravating circumstances, this jurisdiction does not allow recovery for mental
anguish in such actions.'0 4
Justice Wichard then stated that since the complaint did not assert explicitly nor implicitly allegations of malice, wantonness, or
other aggravating circumstance, it fails to state the substantive elements to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. ' 5 Next, Justice Wichard responded to plaintiff's assertion
that his complaint is sufficient to allow recovery for emotional distress under the theory of the intentional infliction of emotional distress.'0 Responding to this contention, the court cited to Stanback. Justice Wichard stated that while this jurisdiction recognized
98. Id. at 14-16, 290 S.E.2d at 733-34.
99. Id. at 15, 290 S.E.2d at 734.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 17-18, 290 S.E.2d at 735.
102. Id. (citing 28 A.L.R.2d 1070, § 7 (1953)).
103. Id. at 18, 290 S.E.2d at 735.
104. Id. (citing Chappell v. Ellis, 123 N.C. 259, 31 S.E. 709 (1898)).
105. Id. at 19, 290 S.E.2d at 736.
106. Id. Justice Wichard additionally refuted plaintiff's contention that the
complaint was sufficient to recover emotional distress under the legal theories of
assault, battery, slander and invasion of privacy. Id.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2
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the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Stanback,
Stanback's plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's conduct ... was wilful, malicious, calculated, deliber-

ate, and purposeful; that defendant acted recklessly and irresponsibly with full knowledge of the consequences which would result;
and that plaintiff suffered great mental anguish and anxiety as a
result'01 ...Here, by contrast, no such allegations appear. Plain-

tiff alleged only that she suffered severe emotional distress and
great embarrassment. She alleged nothing regarding the intent of
defendant's agent or his knowledge of consequences resultant
upon his conduct."0 8
Justice Wichard then stated that the plaintiff failed to allege a
claim for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The complaint failed to satisfy the elementary requirements of the
tort and left to "conjecture that which must be stated." 10 9
In Woodruff v. Miller,"' a 1983 decision, Judge Phillips of the
court of appeals cited to Dickens to decided the issue of whether
defendant's conduct in evidence established all the evidence of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff showed evidence that the defendant obtained 30 year old court documents
relating to a college prank which plaintiff participated in and was
indicted in Orange County, for aiding and abetting a service station break in. These documents constituted copies of the warrant,
bond, preliminary hearing order, indictment and prayer for judgment continued, requiring plaintiff to pay the costs and periodically report his good behavior. Other allegations were that the defendant held ill feelings towards the plaintiff derived from two
bitterly contested lawsuits between them. The defendant posted a
copy of these documents on the post office bulletin board normally
reserved for unapprehended criminals, and alongside such
"Wanted Posters." The defendant indicated to the postmaster that
107. Id. at 21-22, 290 S.E.2d at 737 (quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C.
181, 198, 254 S.E.2d 611, 622-23 (1979)).
108. Id. at 22, 290 S.E.2d at 737.
109. Id. (quoting United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C.App. 400, 405-06,
263 S.E.2d 313, 317, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980)). "A
claim for relief must still satisfy the requirements of the substantive laws which
gave rise to the pleadings, and no amount of liberalization should seduce the
pleader into failing to state enough to give the substantive elements of his claim."
Id. at 17, 290 S.E.2d at 735 (quoting Leasing Corp., 45 N.C. App. at 405, 263
S.E.2d at 317).
110. 64 N.C.App. 364, 307 S.E.2d 176 (1983).
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the defendant had a right to post such documentation since "the
rogue is stealing and I intend to put a stop to it." When the Postmaster disputed defendant's right to post such, the defendant replied that since posters were put up for the federal government
regarding persons stealing, then a "Wanted" poster should be put
up for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
showed the documents to one of the county's leading citizens, and
the defendant posted the documents in and around plaintiff's place
of employment, Alleghany High School, the plaintiff, upon learning
of these occurrences, was anxious, humiliated, embarrassed, and
could not sleep. He had pancreatic bleeding from a long standing
pancreatic condition which is caused by stress. The defendant,
upon learning of plaintiff's debilitating condition, indicated a justification for the defendant's actions.'
In reversing the trial court's j.n.o.v. for the defendant, Judge
Phillips found for the plaintiff regarding the issue of whether
plaintiff had established all of the elements of intentional infliction
of emotional distress."' Judge Phillips stated that j.n.o.v. should
only be entered for the defendant as against the plaintiff when the
essential elements of the alleged claim are not established by the
evidence when viewed in it most favorable light to such plaintiff." 3
He then gave the Dickens rule regarding the requisite evidentiary
showing of the intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause severe emotional distress, and (3) does cause severe emotional distress." He goes on to state the following regarding the defendant's
intentions and conduct:
[t]hat defendant's conduct.., was intended to cause plaintiff severe mental distress and in fact did so is so obviously inferable, it
need not be discussed; and that defendant's conduct was extreme
and outrageous is equally plain... [ffortunate it is for our people
and society that such maliciously destructive and disruptive conduct is regarded as extreme and outrageous ... and that our law
provides an orderly way for the community to disapprove of it
111. Id. at 364-65, 307 S.E.2d at 177. Plaintiff for the previous seventeen
years was the superintendent of the Alleghany County School system and for
many years before that a teacher and high school principal. Id.
112. Id. at 366, 307 S.E.2d at 178.
113. Id. (citing Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 273 S.E.2d 285 (1981)).
114. Id. at 366, 307 S.E.2d at 178 (citing Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437,
276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)).
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and compensate those victimized by it. " 8
In Briggs v. Rosenthal,"" a 1985 North Carolina Court of Appeals case, Judge Parker decided the issue of whether the trial
court committed reversible error in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint following defendant's 12(b)(6) motion. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant Rosenthal wrote an article regarding the plaintiff's son, Warren Briggs, Jr., who had died
recently in an automobile accident, and that the defendant Sun
Publishing Co. had published the article, entitled "Saying Goodbye
to Warren" in a magazine periodical. The article described Warren
in an unpleasant and insulting manner calculated to cause outrage.
The plaintiff alleged that the article was published in an irresponsible and reckless manner, and the defendants, knew or should
have known the article would cause plaintiff's great pain and suffering. The plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer severe anguish
and emotional distress after reading said article. The article read
in part:
[sltrangers usually dislike him [Warren] when he was drinking,
which was alot of the time... He didn't do very well with responsibility ... Warren was a pain in the ass but he was evidence that
we exist... But when you figured that out, what did you do with
Warren? Dismiss him? Feel sorry for him? Call him a drunk and
avoid him? . . . He was confused but so are we ... the things he
kept were wonderful- his spirit, his insistence that boredom was
the enemy, his refusal to be false, Or dishonest. He was a fool
indeed but he was God's fool . . "I
In affirming the trial judge, Judge Parker stated that even
though Dickens recognizes intentional infliction of emotional distress, this case is one of first impression regarding the publication
of an article. " 8 Judge Parker held that it is a question for the court
as a matter of law regarding whether intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of publication may be "reasonably so regarded as extreme and outrageous," and if so, it then is a decision
for the jury regarding whether the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous." 9 Regarding the sufficiency of outrageous115. Id. at 366-67, 307 S.E.2d at 178.
116. 73 N.C. App. 672, 675, 327 S.E.2d 308, 310, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C.
114, 332 S.E.2d 479 (1985).
117. Id. at 672-74, 327 S.E.2d at 309-10.
118.. Id. at 676, 327 S.E.2d at 311.
119. Id.
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ness, he quotes the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, as follows:
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities ...
plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional
acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where some one's
feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion ....12
In finding that the defendant's conduct did not reach the necessary level of extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to preclude
a 12(b)(6) motion, Judge Parker stated that the publication of the
article was not directed towards the defendants, that the magazine
was intended for the public, that the plaintiff's son was the subject
of the article, not the plaintiff, and that there was no physical act
committed against the plaintiff's son. 12 1 Citing to Prosser and Keeton for support, Judge Parker stated, "recovery to third parties 'is
clearly limited to the most extreme cases of violent attack, where
there is some especial likelihood of fright or shock.' ",122
In the 1985 case of Beasley v. National Savings Life Insurance Company,12 3 the court of appeals once again decided whether
the trial court properly granted defendant's motion under Rule
12(b)(6). The plaintiff alleged in his complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress that the defendant issued a hospital
insurance contract covering plaintiff for medical and hospital expenses. The plaintiff paid premiums owed under the contract and
the plaintiff subsequently suffered a heart attack. The plaintiff was
hospitalized and incurred medical expenses in excess of $10,000.
The plaintiff made a claim for benefits under the contract. The
defendant denied plaintiff benefits under the contract. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contractually owed to the plaintiff
the duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly and that defendant
violated its covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the plaintiff
when defendant failed to pay. The plaintiff alleged that, in withholding payment, the defendant acted unreasonably and in bad
faith, and that the defendant committed fraud as against the
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 46 cmt. d (1965)).

Id. at 677-78, 327 S.E.2d at 312.
Id.
75 N.C. App. 104, 330 S.E.2d 207 (1985).
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plaintiff. 2 " Judge Parker cited to the Dickens rule to hold that
plaintiff's attempt to plead the intentional infliction of emotional
distress was fatally defective, in that defendant's actions as alleged
clearly are insufficient to establish the requisite intent. 28
The year 1986 found the court of appeals deciding two other
cases regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
Trought v. Richardson,' Judge Webb decided the issue of
whether the trial court properly granted defendant's motion under
Rule 12(b)(6) regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant-employer, upon notifying plaintiff of plaintiff's discharge from employment at Pitt
County Memorial Hospital, met with several employee groups of
the hospital and told them that the defendant had been discharged
for "lack of credibility." The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
knew that plaintiff's standing in the nursing profession and her job
were the most important aspects of plaintiff's life, and that the
wrongful discharge, in addition to the slanderous communication,
displayed "reckless disregard to the likelihood that it would cause
severe emotional distress to the plaintiff."' 2 7
Judge Webb held that the trial court committed no error regarding the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 2 8 Citing the Dickens rule, in addition to Stanback, he
stated that the defendant's conduct did not reach to the level of
"extreme and outrageous conduct" or conduct which "exceeds all
bounds usually tolerated by decent society."' 2 9
0
In Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Company,"1
the court of
appeals decided the first intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim arising from an alleged employer's sexual harassment. The
plaintiffs' complaint alleged that plaintiff Cornatzer, while em124. Id.
125. Id. at 109, 330 S.E.2d at 210 (quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437,
276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)). Judge Parker distinguished Stanback, the one case on
record recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with
breach of contract, on the personal nature of Stanback's contract, a marital separation agreement, as opposed to the instant case's insurance contract.
126. 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344
S.E.2d 18 (1985).
127. Trought, 78 N.C. App. at 760, 338 S.E.2d at 618, disc. rev. denied, 316
N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1985).
128. Id. at 763, 338 S.E.2d at 620.
129. Id.
130. 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346
S.E.2d 140 (1986).
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ployed by defendant, was shouted at by the defendant's agent (the
club's chef). The verbal abuse was profane, and he interfered with
her duties. The defendant's agent threatened her, made sexually
derogative comments about her and caused her to fear bodily
harm. 13 1 Furthermore, plaintiff Cornatzer alleged that she complained to defendant's principle agent (the club's manager), that
the club manager made no attempt to prevent plaintiff's harassment, that the club manager retained the chef and she was wrong32
fully discharged as a result of her complaints against the chef.1
Plaintiff Hogan alleged that while employed as the manager of
the defendant's dining room, the chef harassed her by shouting
profanities at her, that he interfered with employees under her supervision, that he threatened her and threw objects at her. 33 Furthermore, plaintiff Hogan alleged that, like plaintiff Cornatzer, she
complained to the defendant's management, but once again, no action was taken by the defendant and that she was terminated for
the same reasons as plaintiff Cornatzer, wrongfully and in retaliation for complaints against the chef.3 4
Plaintiff Mitchell contended a similar factual allegation in
comparison to plaintiffs Cornatzer and Hogan. She alleged that,
while employed by the defendant, she became pregnant, and that
she requested and was denied a leave of absence. The club manager harassed her by requiring her to perform tasks which she was
physically unable to accomplish, and that when she experienced
labor pains, she requested to leave work, was subsequently denied
permission, but departed anyway and as a result was terminated.3 5
All three plaintiffs requested relief for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 3 6
Judge Martin first decided the issue of whether the exclusive
remedies provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, G.S. 97-10.1
acted to bar the plaintiff's claims. 37 Acknowledging that this issue
was one of first impression, Judge Martin stated that the Act "does
not bar a common law action by an employee against his employer
for the intentional conduct of the employer."'3 8 Judge Martin dis131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 485-86, 340 S.E.2d at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 488, 340 S.E.2d at 120.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2

24

Little: <em>Dickens v. Puryear</em>
andDISTRESS
Progeny: An Overview of Recent No
EMOTIONAL
1992]

tinguished case law in Andrews v. Peters'"9 and Daniels v. Swofford,140 case law which if found dispositive could be argued to pre-

clude the plaintiffs' claim via the exclusive remedies provision.
Judge Martin stated that:
[t]he intentional conduct involved in Andrews and Daniels was
assaultive conduct for which damages were sought for physical injuries. In the present case, plaintiffs allege severe emotional distress; they do not allege any physical or mental illness nor do they
allege employment disability or loss of earning capacity resulting
from their emotional distress.' 4
Judge Martin then states that since the purpose of the Act is to
furnish compensation for loss of wage earning capacity, and no loss
of earnings capacity is alleged here, then plaintiff's claims are not
compensable under the Act but are still recoverable in a civil action. 14 2 Quoting with approval from Larson in THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Judge Martin then discusses non-physical injury torts as follows:
[w]hen no compensation is available, these tort actions fall
squarely within the broad class of cases . . .which do not come
within the fundamental coverage pattern of the Act 14 . . ..If the

essence of the tort, in law, is non-physical, and if the injuries are4
of the usual non-physical sort ...the suit should not be barred.
Holding that the intentional infliction of emotional distress as alleged by the plaintiffs was not barred by the Act's exclusivity provision, Judge Martin stated in support of that decision that "[tihe
essence of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
139. 55 N.C. App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395,
290 S.E.2d 364 (1982). Judge Martin cited to Andrews, stating that "an employee
is not barred by the Act from bringing a common law action against a co-employee for intentional conduct even though the reverse is true for negligent conduct on the part of the co-employee." Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 488, 340 S.E.2d at
120.
140. 55 N.C.App. 555, 286 S.E.2d 582 (1982). Judge Martin cited to both Andrews and Daniels for the proposition that "the Act bars any common law action
by an employee against his employer for the intentional conduct of a co-employee,
unless the co-employee was acting as an alter ego of the employer." Hogan, 79
N.C. App. at 488, 340 S.E.2d at 120.
141. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 488-89, 340 S.E.2d at 120.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting 2A LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 68.30
(1983)).
144. Id. at 489, 340 S.E.2d at 120 (quoting LARSON at § 68).
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non-physical; the injuries alleged by plaintiff's do not involve phys'48
ical injuries resulting in disability.'
Regarding plaintiff Cornatzer's allegations of blatant sexual
harassment by the defendant's agent, ' 6 Judge Martin stated that
plaintiff Cornatzer's forecast of evidence showed an "irrefutable"
level of outrageous conduct sufficient as a matter of law for the
jury to hear the allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress as against the chef.' 4 7 Defendant, in an attempt to counter
any liability for the chefs actions, stated that the actions were not
committed for any work related purpose." 8 Although agreeing with
the defendant that the chefs actions were not within the scope of
his employment or in the furtherance of any purpose of the defendant and that it appeared that the actions were simply the
chef's own corrupt or lascivious pursuit, Judge Martin stated that
the doctrine of respondeat superior could still hold the defendant
liable for the chefs actions if it is found that his actions were ratified by the defendant. 14'9 Recounting that plaintiff Cornatzer alleged that she notified the manager of the defendant's club of the
chef's actions and that the manager did nothing to prohibit any
further outrageous conduct, it could be imputed that the defendant ratified the chef's conduct, thus raising a jury question as to
whether the defendant should be held liable. 50 Thus, Judge Martin held that the trial court was in error regarding the dismissal of
145. Id. at 490, 340 S.E.2d at 121.
146. Id. Judge Martin recounted the plaintiff's statements recorded in both
her pretrial affidavits and depositions, showing that the chef:
made sexually suggestive remarks to her while she was working, coaxing
her to have sex with him and telling her that he wanted to 'take' her. He
would brush up against her, rub his penis against her buttocks, and
touch her buttocks with his hands. When she refused his advances, he
screamed profane names at her, threatened her with bodily injury, and
on one occasion, advanced toward her with a knife and slammed it down
on a table in front of her.
Id.
147. Id. at 491, 340 S.E.2d at 121.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Snow v. DeButts, 212 N.C. 120, 193 S.E. 224 (1937), for the
general rule that the principal may be liable for the torts of his agent in three
situations:
1) the principal expressly authorizes the agent's actions;
2) the agent's actions are committed within the scope of his employment and in
furtherance of his employment; or
3) the principal ratifies the agent's actions).
150. Id. at 492-93, 340 S.E.2d at 122.
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plaintiff Cornatzer's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).'"
Regarding plaintiffs Hogan's and Mitchell's claims of intentional infliction of emotional, Judge Martin affirmed their dismissals by stating:
[wihile we do not condone Pfeiffer's [the chef's] intemperate conduct [towards Hogan, which consisted of screaming and shouting
at her, calling her names, throwing menus at her, and interfering
with her supervision of waitresses under her charge], neither do
we believe that his alleged acts 'exceed all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society' so as to satisfy the first element of the
tort, requiring a showing of 'extreme and outrageous conduct.'
Mitchell's evidence, if accepted as true by the jury, would
show that Brennan [a club manager] refused to grant her a pregnancy leave of absence, directed her to carry objects such as trash
bags, vacuum cleaners, and bundles of linen weighing more than
10 pounds. He cursed at her on one occasion. When she requested
...to leave work to go to the hospital, Brennan refused... When
she left without his permission, he terminated her from employment... Brennan's alleged conduct, though unjustified under the
circumstances apparent from Mitchell's testimony, was not so 'extreme and outrageous' as to give rise to 1 5a claim for intentional
infliction of mental or emotional distress.
In 1987, the court of appeals decided the issue of whether an
attorney who sends a letter of demand, in anticipation of litigation,
along with a proposed complaint detailing the basis of the claim, to
an adverse party may be deemed sufficiently extreme and outrageous so as to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, in Harris v. NCNB National Bank of North Carolina,'5 3
Judge Martin held that:
[w]hether or not the conduct complained of may reasonably be
regarded as 'extreme and outrageous' is initially a question of law
for the court ...

[therefore] [w]e conclude that the acts of a de-

fendant in sending a letter of demand to an adverse party in anticipation of litigation together with a proposed complaint setting
for the basis of its claim may not be reasonably regarded as extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to support a claim for
151. Id.
152. Id. at 493-94, 340 S.E.2d at 122-23 (citations omitted).
153. 85 N.C. App. 669, 676, 355 S.E.2d 838, 844 (1987) (citing Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App. 627, 327 S.E.2d 308, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 114, 332
S.E.2d 479 (1985)).
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intentional infliction of mental distress.1 4
In Burton v. NCNB National Bank of North Carolina,155 the
court of appeals decided whether a statement made by a bank's
attorney that the bank was considering the pursuit of a criminal
prosecution against an alleged guarantor for filing an inaccurate financial statement was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. At the
time of the alleged tortious statement the plaintiff and the bankdefendant were parties in an action brought by the bank-defendant to recover a debt guaranteed by the plaintiff. 15" Judge Greene
wrote:
[I]f the court determines that the statement may be reasonably
regarded as extreme and outrageous, then it is for the jury to determine whether, under the facts of a particular case, the defendant's conduct in making the statement was in fact extreme and
outrageous . . . [w]e find as a matter of law
that the statement
157
was not extreme and outrageous conduct.
In the 1987, court of appeal's case McKnight v. Simpson's
Beauty Supply, Inc.,'" Judge Phillips decided whether a cause of
action exists in intentional infliction of emotional distress when an
employer discharges an employee abruptly, without cause or explanation. Judge Phillips held that the allegation did not sufficiently
support the first element of the tort, as contemplated by Dickens
and that the dismissal was not sufficiently outrageous, although it
was enough for a breach of contract claim. 59
In Stack v. Mecklenburg County,'"1 another 1987 court of appeals Case, Judge Eagles decided whether a plaintiff employee,
who was raped by a resident of one of the defendant employer's
group homes, could recover under intentional infliction of emotional distress and not be precluded by the Workers' Compensa154. Id. at 676, 355 S.E.2d at 844. Judge Martin cited, in support of his decision, the Dickens rule, in addition to Stanback's characterization of "extreme and
outrageous conduct" as being conduct which "exceeds all bounds usually tolerated
by decent society." Id.
155. 85 N.C. App. 702, 355 S.E.2d 800 (1987).
156. Id. at 706, 355 S.E.2d at 803.
157. Id.
158. 86 N.C. App. 451, 454, 358 S.E.2d 107, 109 (1987).
159. Id. at 454, 358 S.E.2d at 109-10.
160. 86 N.C. App. 550, 359 S.E.2d 16, disc. rev. denied, 321 N.C. 121, 361
S.E.2d 597 (1987).
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tion Act's exclusivity provision. Judge Eagles stated that, while the
court of appeals in Hogan recognized that a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision, the plaintiff failed to allege
the requisite defendant's intent to inflict emotional distress upon
the plaintiff as required by Dickens.16 Hence, Judge Eagles affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for failure
to state a claim. 161
The supreme court revisited the issue of tortious intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the 1988 case West v. King's Department Store, Inc. 6 2 The supreme court held that the trial court
committed error in directing a verdict for the defendant regarding
the issue of whether the defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the plaintiff. 6 ' Justice Frye stated that the
plaintiffs' evidence tended to show that the plaintiffs (husband
and wife) along with their three children and plaintiff-husband's
mother were shopping at defendant's store, that plaintiff-husband
decided to purchase a pair of dolly hand trucks, that they purchased the hand trucks and a cashier gave plaintiff-wife a receipt
and that plaintiff-wife and her mother-in-law took the hand
truck's to the parking lot and locked them in their car, a Ford
Bronco. They soon realized that the store was paging them as owners of a Ford Bronco, upon responding to the page, the plaintiffhusband was accused by the store manager of stealing merchandise. The evidence showed that the manager threatened the plaintiff-husband with arrest if he did not return the goods. The plaintiff-husband denied stealing anything and showed the manager his
receipt for the hand trucks. The manager disregarded the receipts,
saying that the hand trucks had not been for sale. The plaintiffhusband pleaded with the manager not to arrest him, but the manager continued to accuse the plaintiff-husband of stealing, while a
small number of customers surrounded the accused and the accuser. The manager spotted the plaintiff-wife and accused her of
stealing, despite her protests to the contrary. The cashier was offered as verification regarding the purchase, but the manager refused to listen. The plaintiffs finally left the store, after some seventy five minutes of this confrontation had taken place. The
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 555, 359 S.E.2d at 19.
Id.
321 N.C. 698, 365 S.E.2d at 621 (1988).
Id. at 706, 365 S.E.2d at 626.
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plaintiffs' last memory of this confrontation was the manager's reminder that they could be arrested for larceny anytime within the
next year.16 4 Justice Frye cited to Stanback and Dickens for support, when he stated that the "extreme and outrageous conduct of
the store manager" was "manifest."' 6 5 The court continued to explain that the store manager's "unrelenting attack, in the face of
explanation, was both extreme and reckless under the circumstances. Since the intentional element of this tort may be accomplished through reckless behavior, we find this evidence sufficient
to sustain a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional
distress."' 6 6
Spoken words were the crux of the decision in Troxler v.
CharterMandala Center, Inc.167 regarding the issue of whether defendant's conduct as alleged by the plaintiff could, as a matter of
law, be reasonably regarded as extreme and outrageous in order for
the plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to
be able to survive defendant's motion for summary judgement.
The plaintiff alleged in this 1988 court of appeals case, that the
statements made by defendants' employees that plaintiff, while
employed as a mental health worker, had sexual relations with a
minor female patient at defendant's hospital and the alleged manner in which they were communicated caused an intentional infliction of emotional distress.'6 8
Stating that the record was entirely devoid as to any evidence
of outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants' employees,
Judge Smith held that the defendant's administrator, upon receiving information regarding a minor-patient's sexual abuse, acted
properly in investigating these statements and reporting them to
protective services, and that all of the people with whom he spoke
were part of that proper investigative process. Therefore, trial
court acted property in granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 6 9
Matthews v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc.,170 again found the
164. Id. at 699-01, 365 S.E.2d at 622-23.
165. Id. at 704-05, 365 S.E.2d at 625.
166. Id. at 706, 365 S.E.2d at 626.
167. 89 N.C. App. 268, 365 S.E.2d 665, disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 838, 371
S.E.2d 284 (1988).
168. Id. at 274, 365 S.E.2d at 669.
169. Id.
170. 89 N.C. App. 522, 366 S.E.2d 525, disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 836, 371
S.E.2d 284 (1988).
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court of appeals deciding whether an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was dismissed in error. However, this suit
complained of an omission, unlike Brigg's allegedly tortious commission.17 1 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant intentionally
and negligently failed to include the plaintiff's contributions to the
sit-in movement of the 1960's in its publication, Ebony magazine.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant conspired with the National Association of Colored People (NAACP) and certain mayors
and Board of Alderman of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, to suppress and prevent any recognition due the plaintiff from said sitconduct
ins and that the defendant's negligent and conspiratorial
1 72
distress.
emotional
severe
plaintiff's
in
resulted
Judge Smith stated that the majority of plaintiffs claims,
which accrued between the years 1960 up to, but not including,
1985, were barred by the statute of limitations. 173 However, he did
find that defendant's claims which arose from being omitted form
the defendant's 1985 publication of Ebony magazine's fortieth anniversary issue were not statutorily barred.1 74 However, Judge
Smith stated there was no act alleged by the plaintiff that was sufficient to satisfy the Dickens rule. Therefore, defendant's 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action
75
was properly granted.'
17
In Hagel v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of North Carolina,'
the court faced the issue of whether the plaintiff alleged sufficient
facts to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by defendant against the
plaintiff's claim of wilful and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Plaintiff asserted that defendant refused to pay under an
insurance policy for the cost of private nursing rendered to plaintiff's now-deceased spouse, and that the defendant knew of plaintiff's vulnerable physical and mental condition when it refused to
pay. 7 7 Citing to Beasley in support, Judge Smith held that plaintiff's complaint failed, in that it did not allege that defendant
demonstrated "calculated intentional conduct causing emotional
distress directed toward [plaintiff.]"' 7 8
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id. at 523, 366 S.E.2d at 525.
Id. at 524, 366 S.E.2d at 526.
Id.
Id.
91 N.C. App. 58, 370 S.E.2d 695 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 63, 370 S.E.2d at 700 (quoting Beasley v. National Sav. Life Ins.
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Hill v. City of Kinston,17 9 found the North Carolina Court of
Appeals deciding whether the defendant's conduct, as alleged, was
sufficiently extreme and outrageous so as to withstand a motion for
summary judgment as against the complaint of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff, a lieutenant with the Kinston Police Department, had been terminated from that position
following a Board of Inquiry's investigation concerning the officer's
indictment for possessing and receiving stolen goods.' s0 The plaintiff claimed that the Police Chief prepared the disposition of plaintiff's appeal of the Board's decision before a personnel board actually upheld the Board of Inquiry's decision. 181 The plaintiff's
complaint alleged both wrongful dismissal and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the defend8 2
ant's motion for summary judgment."
Judge Wells, stating that "[a] defendant is entitled to summary judgment if he shows that the plaintiff cannot prove one or
more essential elements of his claim.' i 3 He also cited to the decision in Hogan, in which the treatment afforded two out of the
three plaintiff's, while pugnacious in content, did not "exceed all
bounds usually tolerated by a decent society," which caused these
plaintiffs' claims of emotional distress to be defeated by summary
judgment. 1 84 Judge Wells affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in this case, holding that "the process of plaintiff's
dismissal was carried out in a responsible manner' 5 . . . the foreCo., 75 N.C. App 104, 110, 330 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1985)).
179. 92 N.C. App. 375, 374 S.E.2d 425 (1988).
180. Id. The record showed that the officer had learned of a robbery on November 19, 1988, in which several kerosene heaters were stolen; that on the following day, the officer visited a police informant who offered to sell the officer the
above-referenced items; and that the officer purchased the goods, only asking the
informant whether the heaters were his, but not where he obtained them. Id.
Plaintiff's indictment for receiving stolen goods were later dismissed; although the
Board of Inquiry still recommended termination. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 376-77, 374 S.E.2d at 426 (citing Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437,
276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)).
184. Id. at 377, 374 S.E.2d at 426.
185. Id. Judge Wells wrote regarding the forecast of evidence that:
[flollowing his suspension plaintiff's actions and conduct were investigated and heard by a duly constituted Board of Inquiry, which recommended his dismissal. Acting upon the recommendation, defendant
Haigler [the police chief] then notified plaintiff of his dismissal. Plaintiff
then appealed to the city manager, who upheld Haigler's decision. Plain-
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cast of evidence shows no extreme or outrageous conduct on the
part of defendants, an essential element of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. '"186

In Edwards v. Advo Systems, Inc.,187 the court of appeals decided whether defendant's filing of counterclaims against a plaintiff in a prior action can reasonably be regarded as extreme and
outrageous conduct sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for
summary judgment. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant's counterclaims -in the prior action lacked any foundation in
the law or fact and were brought simply for the purpose of intimidating the plaintiff.188
Judge Eagles cited to the Dickens rule regarding the three elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and, quoting
Dickens, included the "reckless" prong when he wrote that the
"[t]he tort may also exist where defendant's actions indicate a
reckless indifference to the likelihood that they will cause severe
emotional distress."18 9 However, whether one looked at the claimed
tortious action from either a purely intentional view, or one of
recklessness, Judge Eagles still found that the plaintiff's claim
could not survive a motion for summary judgment.1 90 He stated
that the "defendants' act of filing counterclaims against plaintiff
may not be reasonably regarded as extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress."' 91
Judge Eagles revisited the issue of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in 1989, when he authored the decision of Leake
v. Sunbelt Ltd. of Raleigh. 92 The complaint in that case alleged
tiff then appealed to the Personnel Board of the City Council, which upheld his dismissal.

Id.
186. Id.
187. 93 N.C. App. 154, 376 S.E.2d 765 (1989), overruled on other grounds,
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85,
reh'g denied, 327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133 (1990).
188. Id. at 155, 376 S.E.2d at 766. The prior action concerned the plaintiff
suing the defendant for lost sales commission. Id. The defendant's counterclaim,
at issue here, was that the plaintiff's negligence in handling certain sales accounts
caused the defendant damages. Id.

189. Id. at 157, 376 S.E.2d at 767.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 93 N.C. App. 199, 377 S.E.2d 285, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 578, 381
S.E.2d 774 (1989).
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fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and intentional infliction of emotional distress regarding the sale of townhouses to
plaintiffs by the agents of the corporate defendant. 193 The alleged
facts were that the agents of the defendant induced the plaintiffs
to buy townhouses in a "planned solar townhome community."
The plaintiffs each bought a townhouse and a large stand of trees
was located within 50 feet. The trees were a major reason for the
purchasing decision for the privacy that they afforded. A defendant-officer of the defendant corporation told one of his agent-sales
representatives that the trees would make it easier to market these
particular townhouses. Soon after the plaintiffs bought their townhouses, they learned that a highway was being built within 50 feet
of their lots resulting in the trees being bulldozed. 194
Judge Eagles noted that in Dickens, the supreme court stated
that through a motion for summary judgment the plaintiff could
be forced to produce a forecast of evidence that would show that
plaintiff could make a prima facie case at trial. 95 This being the
case, Judge Eagles held that nothing in the record would support
the requisite evidentiary showing, as required by Dickens, that the
defendants intended to cause emotional distress, thus affirming the
trial court's order of the summary judgment in the defendant's
favor with regard to the issue of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 96 The court did not, however, expressly analyze the record with reference to the "reckless" prong as it did in Edwards.197
In Mullis v. The Pantry, Inc.,'98 a 1989 court of appeals decision, under review once more was a complaint which alleged a combination of wrongful discharge and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The plaintiff's own deposition showed that at
no time was she discharged from her job as a manager of one of
defendant's convenience stores. Her district manager only told her
that she would no longer be manager at that store, that she would
be put on a vacation for one week and then transferred to another
store. Other conversations were had by plaintiff with other corporate agents of the defendant disclosing that she would be transferred to another store in another district. She was contacted by
193. Id.
194. Id. at 200, 377 S.E.2d at 286.
195. Id. at 205-06, 377 S.E.2d at 289.
196. Id. at 205, 377 S.E.2d at 289.
197. Id.; See supra text accompanying note 187.
198. 93 N.C. App. 591, 378 S.E.2d 578, disc. rev, denied, 325 N.C. 272, 384
S.E.2d 517 (1989).
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her zone manager and asked if she would transfer to another store
within the same town as her original store. Each time plaintiff answered defendant's queries with a reply that she would only return
to her original store. Soon after these and some further negotiations, it came apparent that plaintiff would only return to her original store. 199
After affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendant on the claim of wrongful discharge as a matter of
law, Chief Judge Hedrick held that:
We have carefully examined plaintiff's allegations regarding her
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We hold that
no construction of the forecast of evidence gives rise to an issue as
to whether defendant's conduct was intended to inflict emotional
distress or was done with reckless indifference to the likelihood
that emotional distress may result. Summary judgment for defendant on this claim, like the other, is affirmed."'
In support of this decision, Chief Judge Hedrick cited to Stanback wherein the supreme court stated that liability arises under
this tort when a defendant's "conduct exceeds all bounds usually
tolerated by decent society," and, the conduct "causes mental distress of a very serious kind.

' 201

The court also cited as support the

now perfunctory Dickens rule.20 2
In Murray v. A.A. Justice,"3 a 1989 court of appeals decision,
the plaintiffs were in the retail and wholesale automobile sales business. The plaintiffs brought suit against an inspector employed by
the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles to investigate alleged violations of licensing laws by motor vehicle dealers, manufacturers and salesmen, and motor vehicle odometer alterations
and other violations of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes. 20 4 The

complaint alleged that the defendant maliciously intended to harass the plaintiffs by initiating a hearing regarding the business conduct of the. plaintiff, that the defendant intended to harass and
intimidate the plaintiff when it investigated allegations of illegal
199. Id. at 592-93, 378 S.E.2d at 579.
200. Id. at 593-94, 378 S.E.2d at 580.
201. Id. (citing Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 196, 254 S.E.2d 611, 622
(1979) (quoting WILLAIM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, p.56 (4th ed. 1971)).
202. Id. at 593, 378 S.E.2d at 580.
203. 96 N.C. App. 169, 385 S.E.2d 195 (1989), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 265,
389 S.E.2d 115 (1990).
204. Id. at 171, 385 S.E.2d at 197.
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odometer alterations, and that this resulted in plaintiff being subjected to severe emotional distress and mental anxiety. °5 The defendant, by affidavit, answered that he only knew the plaintiff in a
professional capacity and that he had acted reasonably, and within
the customs of his position and within the scope and course of his
employment, and that he bore the plaintiff no ill will or malice.2 6
Judge Eagles cited to the familiar litany of the Dickens rule
regarding the essential elements of a claim for the tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress: "(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct; (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe
emotional distress to another. The tort may also exist where defendant's actions indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood
that they will cause severe emotional distress,

' 20 7

Judge Eagles also

cited to Stanback's definition for that level of 'extreme and outrageous conduct' required for recovery; conduct which 'exceeds all
bounds usually tolerated by decent society,'20 8 and the Brigg's ruling "[t]he determination of what is extreme and outrageous conduct is a question of law for the court."20 9
Judge Eagles concluded:
[TIhe defendant's conduct was within the scope of his employment and was under the directions of his superior. In our judgment, it could not reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to satisfy a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional210distress. Summary judgment for the defendant was
...proper.
Medlin v. Bass2 " was the last case the court of appeals

handed down in 1989 concerning whether defendant's motion for
summary judgment was properly granted against the plaintiff's allegation of tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
plaintiff, a nine-year old fourth grade student at the time of the
incident, alleged that she was twice assaulted by her principal and
that this resulted in the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
She alleged that the superintendent and the assistant superinten205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
587, 398

Id. at 172, 385 S.E.2d at 198.
Id.
Id. at 175, 385 S.E.2d at 200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
96 N.C. App. 410, 386 S.E.2d 80 (1989), afJ'd on other grounds, 327 N.C.
S.E.2d 460 (1990).
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dent of the local Board of Education were liable for the negligent
investigation, hiring and supervision of the principal. She claimed
that a school truancy officer was liable for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress and failure to properly investigate the plaintiff's school attendance problems, and that all actions by the principal, the superintendent, the assistant superintendent, and the
school truancy officer should be attributed to the Board of Education and asserted each claim for relief previously described against
the Board.2 1 2 The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in favor of the superintendent, the assistant superintendent, the truancy officer and the Board of Education.213 The
plaintiff appealed, stating that there were genuine issues of material fact which should have defeated the defendants' motion for
summary judgment." '
The claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as
against the assistant superintendent, was predicated on his filing of
a juvenile petition against the plaintiff concerning her truancy
problems. 1 5 Judge Lewis stated that there was no evidence that
the assistant superintendent knew of the principal's alleged assault, and that what the evidence did show was that he adhered to
his job expectations and requirements. 2 6 Citing to the Dickens
rule, Judge Lewis wrote that there was no evidence presented as to
any element of the tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress as against the assistant superintendent." Hence, the Board
of Education would not be liable for any imputed intentional infliction of emotional distress as derived from the assistant superintendent's actions.21 8
As for the Board of Education's imputed liability for the principal's alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, Judge
Lewis cited to Hogan, stating that:
An employer can be held vicariously liable for the torts of its employees in three situations: (1) when the employer expressly authorizes the employee's act; (2) when the employee's act is committed in the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the
212. Id. at 412, 386 S.E.2d at 80-81.
213. Id. at 413, 386 S.E.2d at 81. The claim as against the principal remained. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 415, 386 S.E.2d at 82.
216. Id. at 415, 386 S.E.2d at 83.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 416, 386 S.E.2d at 83.
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employer's business; or (3) when the employer ratifies the employee's act.2" 9
Judge Lewis held that in the case at bar there was no claim of
express authorization for the principal's actions, that there were no
issues of material fact as to whether the principal was acting
within the scope or furtherance of his employment in that he was
not performing the business that he was employed to do when he
allegedly assaulted the plaintiff, and that there was no ratification
by the Board of Education of the principal's alleged actions in that
the Board had no prior notice of his conduct and immediately
sought the principal's resignation upon learning of the alleged assaults. 220 Therefore, Judge Lewis affirmed the granting of summary
judgment on the claims against the Board of Education.2 2'
In White v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital,222 a 1990 decision, the court of appeals reviewed the granting of a motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and breach of contract against the defendant,
her former employer. Affidavits and other materials before the
court indicated that the defendant had employed the plaintiff as a
full time nurses' assistant for over 34 years until plaintiff was discharged due to a disabling illness. Plaintiff's employment had
never been under a written contractual agreement, but the plaintiff
was covered for several years before the aforementioned discharge
by the defendant's low cost group medical insurance plan. This insurance plan was limited to one million dollars. Upon being disabled, the plaintiff was unable to maintain such insurance due to
the defendant's group carrier not permitting disabled former employees to continue under it, notwithstanding defendant's PERSON219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. In a dissent, Judge Phillips differed with the majority's decision regarding whether the principal acted within the scope of his authority. Id. Judge
Phillips wrote that the issue is a question of fact, unlike the majority's "at law"
analysis. In support of his position, Judge Phillips states that:
[slince the board endowed Bass [the principal] with authority and control over the school and Bass exercised that authority to abuse plaintiff,
it can be reasonably inferred, it seems to me, that the board's work of
operating the school and controlling the children was very definitely involved in plaintiff's abuse.
Id. at 417, 386 S.E.2d at 83
222. 97 N.C.App. 130, 387 S.E.2d 80, disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 601, 393
S.E.2d 890 (1990).
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NEL POLICIES HANDBOOK

stating that "A full time employee who

become disabled during his employment will be able to maintain
his group insurance." As a result of plaintiff's inability to maintain
said insurance, plaintiff was forced to obtain an individual policy
which cost more than the group policy and was limited to only one
hundred thousand dollars.22 3 Judge Phillips summarily affirmed
the judgment of the trial court on the tortious intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim stating that:
Obviously, the foregoing forecast of proof raises no genuine issue
of material fact in the claim for intentionally inflicting emotional
distress, and that claim was properly dismissed. Since plaintiff
did not argue
otherwise in the brief she abandoned the claim in
4
22

any event.

McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc.,2' 25 a 1990 court of appeals
case, brought another publisher back into the judicial arena to defend itself against a plaintiff's claim of libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff's complaint was prompted
by the defendant's publication of two articles which concerned a
dispute between the plaintiff and her neighbor regarding the
neighbor's barking dogs. The dogs barked to such a degree that the
plaintiff and the neighbor swore out warrants against each other.2 26
Within these two articles were three statements which constitute
the gravamen of the case:
Ms. McKinney made international headlines several years ago for
allegedly kidnapping and raping a Mormon missionary in
London, England. Ms. McKinney fled Europe before the trial was
over and is still listed in Interpol although authorities in England
have made no attempt to extradite her.
Ms. McKinney could not be reached for comment. .

.

. Avery

County Sheriff's Department has been unable to locate Ms.
McKinney.
Joy McKinney never came in to have the warrant served and
make bond and apparently left the county in an attempt to avoid
2 7

arrest.

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 99
123 (1990).
226. Id.
227. Id.

at 130-31, 387 S.E.2d at 80-81.
at 131, 387 S.E.2d at 81 (citations omitted).
N.C. App. 529, 393 S.E.2d 295, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 636, 399 S.E.2d
at 530, 393 S.E.2d at 296.
at 530-31, 393 S.E.2d at 296.
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Judge Johnson wrote that the record revealed that the defendant only published a "fairly innocuous condensation of numerous
articles which had been published previously by reputable newspapers." [The Charlotte Observer, The Winston-Salem Journal, The
Asheville Citizen, The GreensboroDaily News, and The News and
Observer]2 8 Additionally, the record showed that the defendant
also relied on information received from the local Sheriff concerning the plaintiff allegedly being listed on Interpol and to the status
of the warrant sworn out against the plaintiff.2 9 Citing to Dickens
for support, Judge Johnson quoted Briggs, as follows in affirming
the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant:
"This conduct simply does not rise to the level of behavior 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' "230
In Waddle v. Sparks,2 1 a 1990 the court of appeals decided a

case in which summary judgment had been granted against the
plaintiffs and was factually similar to that of Hogan. In this case,
there were two female plaintiffs, and they both brought actions
against their shift-supervisor for the tortious intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and against their former employer for negligent hiring and retention of said supervisor.232
Plaintiff Waddle alleged that the defendant-supervisor made
several "vulgar and filthy" comments regarding her worrying about
a coworker's genitals, that upon plaintiff's finger becoming infected
with pus, she had a "p- finger," that the defendant constantly
used sexual innuendoes and interjected sexual comments into ordinary statements. She alleged that on two occasions the defendant
tried to brush up against the plaintiff's breasts, and thereafter, the
plaintiff continually watched out for these physical attempts in order to avoid them. The defendant ventured that plaintiff knew
how to use certain parts of her anatomy. The plaintiff complained
about the defendant to the assistant plant manager about the "vulgar and filthy" conduct, resulting in a verbal reprimand being
228. Id. at 532-34, 393 S.E.2d at 297-98.
229. Id. at 532, 393 S.E.2d at 297.
230. Id. at 534, 393 S.E.2d at 298 (quoting Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App.
627, 677, 327 S.E.2d 308, 311, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 114, 332 S.E.2d 479
(1985) and citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Cmt. d)).
231. 100 N.C. App. 129, 394 S.E.2d 683 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, No.
476A90, slip op. (N.C. Mar. 5, 1990).
232. Id.
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given to the defendant. Later, the plaintiff again complained about
2 33
defendant's behavior, this time to the personnel director.
Judge Orr stated that there were sufficient facts to question:
whether the defendant's actions were extreme and outrageous,
whether the defendant did not intend to cause severe emotional
distress, whether the plaintiff suffered emotional distress, whether
the defendant was acting in the course and scope of his employment and whether his conduct was ratified implicitly by the corporate defendant.2 34 Therefore Judge Orr held that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment against the plaintiff
Waddle.2 35
Concerning the plaintiff Simpson, Judge Orr held that summary judgment was appropriate for the defendant on the allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the individual defendant. 3 6 While the defendant Simpson alleged similar
foul language, sexual innuendoes, and obscene gestures suffered at
the hands of the defendant supervisor, Judge Orr noted that the
plaintiff Simpson could not place any time reference in which the
defendant allegedly intentionally inflicted emotional distress.2 3
Therefore, in light of the statutory three year period of limitations
being raised as a defense by the defendant, Judge Orr affirmed the
granting of summary judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff Simpson. 3 8
On January 10, 1991, the supreme court allowed discretionary
review of Waddle v. Sparks. 39 The court held that the court of
appeals should have affirmed summary judgments entered for de240
fendants against both Waddle and Simpson.
Chief Justice Exum stated that the plaintiff Waddle failed to
forecast sufficient evidence of severe emotional distress, therefore
41
not overcoming the defendants' summary judgment motion.1
While citing to Dickens for the essential elements, Chief Justice
Exum pointed to the fact that Dickens "failed to address in any
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 132, 394 S.E.2d at 686.
Id. at 133, 394 S.E.2d at 686.
Id.
Id. at 134, 394 S.E.2d at 687.
Id.
Id.
Waddle, No.. 476A90, slip op. at 1-2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 11.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992

41

228

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

detail the severe emotional distress element .
referencing Ruark, C.J. Exum wrote:

[Vol. 14:187

*...42

However,

This is not the first time we have broached a definition of the
element of severe emotional distress. In the context of a claim for
negligent infliction of mental distress, we stated "the term 'severe
emotional distress' means any emotional or mental disorder, such
as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia,
or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental
condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by
professionals trained to do so ' ' 21 s . . . We see no reason not to
adopt the same standard for a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. At a minimum, applying the same standard to
both 4torts promotes a symmetry desirable in this area of the
24
law.
For further support, Justice Exum quoted the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, stating, in part, that: "[i]t is only where it is extreme that the liability arises . . . [t]he law intervenes only where
the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could ex' '245
pected to endure it.

Stating that there was no "forecast of any medical documentation of plaintiff's alleged 'severe emotional distress' nor any other
forecast of evidence of 'severe and disabling' psychological
problems within the meaning of the test laid down in" Ruark, the

court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment and
reversed the court of appeals' decision to the contrary. 4"
Rogers v. T.J.X. Companies, Inc.24 7 found the court of appeals

deciding the issue of whether summary judgment was properly entered for the defendants when the plaintiff complained that the
corporate defendant and individual defendant falsely imprisoned
and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her when she
242. Id. at 11-12.
243. Id. at 12 (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assoc.,
327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97, reh'g denied,'327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133
(1990)).
244. Waddle, No. 476A90, slip op. at 12.
245. Id. at 13 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965)
(emphasis supplied by the Court)).
246. Id. at 14-15. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' unanimous decision granting summary judgment as against the plaintiff Simpson on the issue of

the statute of limitation barring said plaintiffs action as against the defendant
Sparks. Id. at 15.
247. 101 N.C. App. 99, 398 S.E.2d 610 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 329
N.C. 266, 404 S.E.2d 664 (1991).
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was acting as their store patron.
The evidence tended to show that the plaintiff went to the defendant's store to shop for kitchen linens and tablecloths. Plaintiff
was wearing bermuda shorts, a white T-shirt and sandals and carried a pocketbook which contained cosmetics, her wallet, her
glasses case, a packet of material samples in a clear ziploc bag, and
a couple of pens. Upon entering the store, the plaintiff went to the
cosmetics counter, before proceeding to the linen department, and
then looked at some dishes and cut glass before exiting the store.
The plaintiff's stay in the store was approximately twenty to
twenty-five minutes. The plaintiff at no time entered the lingerie
department or examine any lingerie. Upon exiting the store, the
plaintiff was approached by the defendant-security guard who
showed the plaintiff his badge and identified himself as store security. The security guard asked the plaintiff to return to the store
to speak to her about some merchandise. The plaintiff told the defendant that he was making a mistake, but agreed to return with
him anyway. The plaintiff accompanied the defendant to his office,
the defendant following the plaintiff closely in full view of other
store patrons. The defendant told her that "Good customers will
steal." The plaintiff dumped the contents of her pocketbook onto
the defendant's desk. The defendant left the plaintiff in his office
for fifteen minutes, and the plaintiff did not leave because she felt
that she was free to leave. Upon the defendant's return, the plaintiff stated that she did not do anything wrong and wished to leave.
The defendant replied that "all we want is our merchandise. What
did you do with it? You were in our lingerie department." The
plaintiff explained that she was not in the lingerie department, but
the defendant continued to request the return of the stolen items
and refused tell the plaintiff what particular item that he wanted.
The defendant told the plaintiff not to touch her belongings which
she had removed from her pocketbook. The defendant instructed
the plaintiff to read from a clipboard containing the message that
the store had the right to detain and question anyone that it had
reason to believe had been shoplifting. After reading the clipboard,
the plaintiff told the defendant that she had not been shoplifting
and that he was wrong. The defendant responded: "Ma'am, I was
only five feet from you the whole time you were in the store." The
plaintiff responded that "If you were only five feet from me, you
know I was not in the lingerie department. You know I didn't steal
anything." The defendant had the plaintiff read a card which contained the Miranda warnings. The defendant, in response to the
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
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plaintiff requesting him to be quiet so she could read the card,
stated: "Usually the dog that barks the loudest is guilty." Finally,
after thirty minutes, the plaintiff was told by the defendant that
she was free to go, after having been told that she had to sign the
Miranda card and one which released the store from liability. She
complied with both requests, and that as a result of this incident,
the plaintiff then experienced mental and physical infirmities.2 48
Chief Judge Hedrick held that the facts as alleged were sufficient to assert the tortious infliction of emotional distress.2 4' 9 He
stated that:
We find the facts of the case sub judice sufficient to raise genuine
issues of material fact as to whether 'defendant's actions indicate
a reckless indifference to the likelihood that they will cause emotional distress' and hold the trial court erred in entering summary
judgment against plaintiff with respect to her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. °
Finally, in Shillington v. K-Mart,251 a 1991 court of appeals
decision, the court decided whether a plaintiff who had previously
been arrested and tried for trespassing on the defendant's store
property and for looting merchandise following a devastating tornado, had made a sufficient showing of evidence to defeat the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff's evidence
tended to show that during the early morning hours of November
28, 1988, a tornado struck and completely destroyed a K-Mart in
Raleigh, North Carolina, and the winds scattered the defendant's
property over a wide area including the ravine behind the store.
On that morning the plaintiff, an employee at the ATEC building,
a structure several hundred feet to the northwest of the K-Mart,
decided to survey the damage along with a co-worker. The two encountered a police officer and the three amicably talked for 15-20
minutes. The officer told them not to go into an area near the KMart. Upon returning to the ATEC building, which had also been
damaged from the tornado, the plaintiff and the co-worker discovered that some documents and equipment were missing, and as a
result, the two began to search for the missing documents and
equipment. In the course of said search, the plaintiff and the co248. Id. at 101-03, 398 S.E.2d at 611-12.
249. Id. at 106, 398 S.E.2d at 614.
250. Id. at 106-07, 398 S.E.2d at 614 (quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C.
437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981)).

251. 102 N.C. App. 187, 402 S.E.2d 155 (1991).
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worker walked along the ridge behind the K-Mart. While moving
in this area, the plaintiff picked up some K-Mart merchandise, a
coat, and placed it on a tree in the open. Some time later, a KMart security guard saw the plaintiff and requested that the plaintiff come to him, the plaintiff complied with this request. The security guard took the plaintiff by the arm and searched the plaintiff. The plaintiff attempted to explain his presence but the guard
refused to listen. As a result of statements given by that guard to
the police that the plaintiff had come on K-Mart's property and
was picking up the defendant's merchandise and had thrown an
item down when challenged, the plaintiff was arrested.25 2
Judge Johnson held that the trial judge did not commit error
when he granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict on
plaintiff's claim for tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress because the defendant's conduct could not reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous.2 53 Noting that the "events in
question occurred during a state of emergency following a devastating tornado" and that "[pilaintiff was walking in an area close
proximity to the defendant's property and in an area where defendant's merchandise had been scattered by the winds, 2 14 Judge
Johnson held that given what the guard saw (implicitly including
the defendant's agents perceiving the plaintiff picking up an item
of K-Mart property and putting it down) the guard's simple refusal to listen to plaintiff's explanation, "while rude and officious,
does not reach the level of being extreme and outrageous. "255
III.

CONCLUSION

The supreme court in Dickens decided the requisite evidentiary showing to recover for the tortious intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Upon doing so, the court disapproved of its earlier decision in Stanback. No longer is there a required showing of
a contemporaneous physical injury, nor an injury directly resulting
from the defendant's egregious behavior. Moreover, the supreme
court refuted any necessary showing that it was foreseeable that
the defendant's actions would result in the plaintiff's severe emotional distress. Rather, the plaintiff must prove only that the defendant either intended such result or was reckless in his action,
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 191-92, 402 S.E.2d at 157-58.
Id. at 198, 402 S.E.2d at 161.
Id.
Id.
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and that severe emotional distress was an actual result.
Without the additional evidentiary "baggage" of foreseeability
and physical injury to prove, one may have presupposed that a litigious "floodgate" alleging the tortious intentional infliction of
emotional distress would soon have ensued. However, for the past
ten years, the appellate courts have affirmed several procedural
rulings which have stated that the plaintiff either failed to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), did not provide the proper evidentiary forecast in order to defeat the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, or did not produce sufficient evidence to survive a motion for directed verdict.
The supreme court, in following what was then national trend,
in not requiring physical injury or foreseeability, is now encased
within the vast majority of jurisdictions regarding the requisite evidentiary showing. In doing so, the supreme court allowed a common law tort recovery for non-physical sexual harassment, for extreme debt collection practices, against overzealous department
store employees whose egos are skewered by an overwrought sense
of self importance, and against vengeful parties who would maliciously destroy and disrupt other people's lives with conduct so extreme that one would exclaim "Outrage!"
Conversely, the North Carolina courts, in their caselaw, have
narrowly defined what factually constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct. When the facts dictate a commercial setting, the
alleged "intent" is more likely to be dispositive in the action. Thus,
when dealing with insurance contracts, legal actions between parties, real estate transactions, or at-will employment terminations,
the court is likely to find an evidentiary failure in the plaintiff's
case regarding "intent" to the extent that "recklessness" is given
shortshrift.
Perhaps, in attempting to discern any non-changing particular
judicial mindset as to what constitutes extreme and outrageous behavior, one should look to the court's consistent and logical application of the Dickens' rule, holding that there may be recovery
under the tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress as defined by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. In doing so, one
would then further look to the other heavily cited secondary
source, William Prosser, and his often quoted passage that liability
arises under this tort when a defendant's "conduct exceeds all
bounds usually tolerated by decent society." In reading the appellate decisions using Prosser's comment as a yardstick, one finds
that the North Carolina courts have been consistent and fair,
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss2/2
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weighing both the plaintiff's need for proper redress, in addition to
the public's need for a society in which the slightest offense or
even rude and officious behavior can and should be tolerated in
order to promote the free discourse of ideas and relationships.
William B. L. Little
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